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INTRODUCTION 
Computers are making an increasing number of important decisions in 
our lives. They fly airplanes, navigate traffic, and even recommend books. In 
the process, computers reason through automated algorithms and constantly 
send and receive information, sometimes in ways that mimic human 
expression. When can such communications, called here “algorithmic 
outputs,” claim First Amendment protection? 
The question of “rights for robots,” if once limited to science fiction, has 
now entered the public debate. In recent years, firms like Verizon and 
Google have relied on First Amendment defenses against common-law and 
regulatory claims by arguing that some aspect of an automated process is 
speech protected by the Constitution.1 These questions will only grow in 
importance as computers become involved in more areas of human decision-
making. 
A simple approach, favored by some commentators, says that the First 
Amendment presumptively covers algorithmic output so long as the pro-
gram seeks to communicate some message or opinion to its audience.2 But 
while simplicity is attractive, so is being right. In practice, the approach 
yields results both absurd and disruptive;3 the example of the car alarm 
shows why. The modern car alarm is a sophisticated computer program that 
uses an algorithm to decide when to communicate its opinions, and when it 
does it seeks to send a particularized message well understood by its audi-
ence. It meets all the qualifications stated: yet clearly something is wrong 
with a standard that grants Constitutional protection to an electronic 
annoyance device. Something is missing. 
The big missing piece is functionality. More specifically, what’s being 
overlooked is the differential treatment courts should accord communications 
closely tied to some functional task. A close reading of the relevant cases 
suggests that courts, in fact, limit coverage in a way that reserves the power 
 
1 See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (declining to address Verizon’s First Amendment arguments against the 
subpoena provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., 
Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (finding that Google 
PageRanks are entitled to “full” First Amendment protection).  
2 This position is best represented by Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4. This approach 
derives from Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). Stuart Benjamin relies on a 
similar standard in Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013). See also EUGENE 
VOLOKH & DONALD FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR SEARCH ENGINE SEARCH 
RESULTS 6-7 (2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Search 
EngineFirstAmendment.pdf (arguing that the First Amendment protects Google’s search results). 
3 See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text. 
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of the state to regulate the functional aspects of the communication process, 
while protecting its expressive aspects.4 Here, I go further and suggest that 
the law contains a de facto functionality doctrine that must be central to any 
consideration of machine speech. 
The doctrine operates in two distinct ways. First, courts tend to with-
hold protection from carrier/conduits—actors who handle, transform, or 
process information, but whose relationship with speech or information is 
ultimately functional. Definitive examples are Federal Express or the 
telephone company, common carriers to whom the law does not grant 
speech rights. Those who merely carry information from place to place 
(courier services) generally don’t enjoy First Amendment protection, while 
those who select a distinct repertoire, like a newspaper or cable operator, do. 
Similarly, those who provide the facilities for job interviews are not recog-
nized as speakers, nor are the manufacturers of technologies that record or 
transform information from one form into another—like a typewriter, 
photocopier, or loudspeaker.5 
Second, courts do not normally protect tools—works whose use of in-
formation is purely functional, such as navigational charts, court filings, or 
contracts. The reasons are complex, and related to a broader nonprotection 
of information that by its very communication performs some task. In the 
words of language philosophers these are “speech acts,” “illocutionary acts,” 
or “situation-altering utterances.” The broader category includes the 
communications embodied in criminal commands, commercial paper, 
nutritional information, and price-fixing conspiracies.6 
Combined, these two tendencies form a de facto functionality doctrine, 
which, as we shall see, is central to understanding the First Amendment in 
the context of algorithmic output (and, thankfully, excludes car alarms from 
the protections of the Constitution). For one thing, in many cases the fact 
that an algorithm makes the decisions in software cases is in tension with 
the requirement of knowing selection or intimate identification. Other 
times, algorithmic output falls into the category of communication that acts 
by its very appearance.7 Warnings, status indications, directions, and similar 
signals are common outputs for computer software in this category. These 
outputs act to warn or instruct and are therefore similar analytically to 
something like a criminal command or conspiracy. 
 
4 See infra subsections III.B.1–2.  
5 See infra subsection III.B.1. 
6 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
7 See infra Section IV.A. 
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In an area as complex as this, a rule of thumb might be useful. Generally, 
we can distinguish software that serves as a “speech product” from that 
which is a “communication tool.” Communication tools fall into the catego-
ries just described: they primarily facilitate the communications of another 
person, or perform some task for the user. In contrast, speech products are 
technologies like blog posts, tweets, video games, newspapers, and so on, 
that are viewed as vessels for the ideas of a speaker, or whose content has 
been consciously curated.  
The boundary between one and the other may be imperfect, but it must 
be drawn somewhere if the First Amendment is to be confined to its 
primary goal of protecting the expression of ideas, and if we are to prevent 
its abuse. If a software designer is primarily interested in facilitating some 
task for the user, he will be unlikely to have the space to communicate his 
own ideas. At a minimum, his ideas must bend to operations. Thus, the 
intent is not to communicate ideas, or, as the Supreme Court puts it, “affect 
public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct 
espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought 
which characterizes all artistic expression.”8 
In what follows, I introduce these ideas more thoroughly and, along the 
way, consider the speech status of blogging and microblogging software like 
Twitter, GPS navigation software, search engines, and automated concierges. 
The importance of these matters cannot be overstated. Too little protection 
would disserve speakers who have evolved beyond the printed pamphlet. 
Too much protection would threaten to constitutionalize many areas of 
commerce and private concern without promoting the values of the First 
Amendment. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Humans have long created machines capable of responding to external 
conditions in a manner that resembles a decision. The thermostat, a device 
that controls the temperature of a room, might be said to decide when to 
turn on or off a heater. Automatic transmission might similarly be said to 
decide when to switch gears.  
Over the last century, such machine decisionmaking has become much 
more sophisticated, as has the expression of its results. In the past, computers 
communicated the results of their processes to humans with simple lights, 
dials, or sounds. Today, machines express outputs in forms easily under-
stood by humans: words on a screen, pictures, or speech. This is analogous 
 
8 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (footnote omitted). 
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to the difference between an oven that beeps when it reaches a desired 
temperature, and a GPS device that verbally instructs its user how to get 
home. In communications theory terms, both are signals. 9  The latter, 
however, is more readily described as “speech” because it is translated into 
language and mimics human expression. 
To further flesh out the problem of automated reasoning, it might help 
to consider the following examples of algorithms, computerized or otherwise, 
that function in twenty-first-century life in arguably expressive ways: 
1. A computerized car alarm, when active, monitors the inputs of var-
ious shock sensors and motion detectors, and, on that basis, decides 
whether to sound a warning or a full alarm. 
2. A computerized antilock braking system, noticing that brakes are in 
danger of locking, overrides a braking decision and reduces braking 
force on a wheel about to lock, signaling such by vibrating the brake 
pedal.  
3. Apple’s navigation program, based on available routes and traffic 
data, suggests the fastest way to drive from Hyde Park to O’Hare 
Airport. 
4. Google decides which web links and other information to display in 
response to queries like “NFL schedule” and “Rosh Hashanah.”10 
5. Facebook, based on a user’s specified interests (say “motorcycles” 
and “travel”), decides which ads to display to that user. 
6. Amazon chooses books to recommend to a customer based on the 
fact that other people bought books similar to ones the customer al-
ready purchased. 
7. Apple’s automatic DJ program personalizes a playlist for users 
based on the songs they own. 
8. In the course of a computer game, a computer-generated villain de-
cides to fire a missile to kill the human-controlled player. 
In all of these examples, a computer, following a program or algorithm, 
decides among several alternatives, and expresses that choice in a manner 
understandable to a human. As such, it creates a narrow but vexing category 
of expression.  
 
9 See ROLAND PRIEMER, INTRODUCTORY SIGNAL PROCESSING 1 (1991) (defining a “signal” 
as “a function that conveys information about the behavior of a system or attributes of some 
phenomenon”). 
10 According to Google, these two phrases were popular search terms entered into its engine 
on September 17, 2012. Trends, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/trends/hottrends (Sept. 17, 2012). 
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II. BOUNDARIES 
The main goal of this Part is to specify the conditions under which the 
First Amendment is triggered by algorithmic output. I do not present a new 
descriptive theory in this Part. Rather, the goal is to describe what generally 
triggers constitutional scrutiny.  
It is important to clarify the meaning of “trigger.” Courts face two dis-
tinct questions when determining whether a law violates the First Amend-
ment. The first is whether the First Amendment is even relevant—that is, 
whether the law should even be evaluated with respect to the standards of 
scrutiny imposed by the First Amendment. Scholars refer to this as a 
question of “coverage.” Second, courts may ask whether the law survives 
scrutiny. This is the question of “protection.” For the purposes of this paper, 
the First Amendment is triggered when the relevant speech act is “cov-
ered.”11 
The lines that demarcate coverage under the First Amendment often 
must be inferred, as they are only sometimes discussed explicitly. Consider 
four such lines. First, along one dimension, a “person” must claim any 
constitutional right, which includes those in the First Amendment. Second, 
only communications that qualify as “speech” gain First Amendment 
protections. Third, in nearly any case, an illicit censorial “motivation” on the 
part of the Government can trigger the First Amendment, even if the 
communications at issue would not otherwise be covered. Finally, some-
times courts find that a law does not actually affect speech because, perhaps 
by the law’s very nature, it tends to promote it. For want of a better term, 
this can be understood as an “abridgement” jurisprudence; some laws simply 
are not of a nature that abridge speech, and therefore do not activate First 
Amendment analysis.  
Each of these lines—personhood, speech, motive, and abridgement—is 
relevant to the problem of computer program output. I consider each in turn.  
A. Personhood 
The famous case of Blackie the Talking Cat12 frames the personhood issue. 
Blackie was a cat trained by his owners to speak various English sentences 
 
11  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 90 (1982) 
(“[W]hen we say that certain acts, or a certain class of acts, are covered by a right, we are not 
necessarily saying that those acts will always be protected. We are saying only that these acts have 
a facial claim to be considered with reference to the reasons underlying the decision to put those 
acts within the coverage of a right.”). 
12 Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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(like “I love you”).13 Carl and Elaine Miles asked for donations from those 
who enjoyed Blackie’s discourse. The City of Atlanta demanded that he 
operate pursuant to a business license. The Mileses asserted (among other 
claims) that the City’s demand infringed Blackie’s rights under the First 
Amendment.14 
Ruling against Blackie, the court dismissed the cat’s First Amendment 
claims and held that 
[t]his Court will not hear a claim that Blackie’s right to free speech has been 
infringed. First, although Blackie arguably possesses a very unusual ability, 
he cannot be considered a “person” and is therefore not protected by the 
Bill of Rights. Second, even if Blackie had such a right, we see no need for 
appellants to assert his right jus tertii. Blackie can clearly speak for himself.15 
It should be clear that a computer and Blackie are similar. Neither is human, 
and both have been trained to express themselves in a way that is infor-
mative or entertaining to humans. As such, Blackie the Talking Cat is indica-
tive of one way that courts treat nonhumans who generate what resembles 
human speech: not very seriously.16 The approach taken toward intelligent 
animals would generally deny all rights in a case where a nonhuman is the 
would-be speaker. 
The presumption in Blackie—that the identity of the speaker matters for 
the First Amendment—is also reflected by courts’ treatment of children and 
young adults. Judicial decisions in the last four decades suggest that young 
people have First Amendment rights, but fewer than those of adults. The 
Supreme Court, for example, has permitted various forms of censorship of 
students that would violate the First Amendment if practiced against adults. 
This rule is evident in one of the many high school speech cases, Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier.17 A high school newspaper planned to publish 
controversial articles about teenage pregnancy and the effect of parental 
 
13 Id. at 1543.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1544 n.5. 
16 Animals who have claimed protections of other constitutional rights have also been unsuc-
cessful in court. See, e.g., Tilikum v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 
(S.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment applies only to persons and not to orca 
whales). On the other hand, some states have passed laws banning surgery to silence pets. E.g., 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 80(b) (West 2012).  
17 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The rule is also manifest in Broussard v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 
in which the court held that a middle school administrator could prohibit a student from wearing a 
shirt displaying the word “suck” without violating the First Amendment. 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1537 
(E.D. Va. 1992) 
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divorce on students.18 The school’s principal censored both articles based on 
their content.19 While such censorship would be a clear violation “outside 
the school,” 20  the Court upheld the censorship, explaining that First 
Amendment rights of students in public schools “are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”21  
Courts treat corporations far more generously than either young adults or 
animals. Since First National Bank of Boston v. Belloti in 1978,22 the Supreme 
Court has taken the position that when a corporation is speaking, courts 
should ignore the identity of the speaker and focus on the nature of the 
expression. As Justice Powell declared for the Court, “The proper ques-
tion . . . is not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if 
so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the 
question must be whether [the law] abridges expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect.”23 When a corporation has expressed 
itself in a manner that resembles human speech, the Court has granted the 
protections of the First Amendment, implicitly conceding the corporation’s 
equal standing with humans. And any lingering doubts about whether 
corporations other than “the press” have full First Amendment protection 
were erased in Citizens United v. FEC.24  
The treatment of corporations is in evident tension with the decisions 
regarding animals and young adults. Children, like corporations, occasionally 
express themselves with eloquence and apparent conviction. Many dog 
owners seem capable of understanding their pets’ expression as clearly as if 
it were Walter Cronkite reading the evening news. If we merely consider 
whether a particular communication is an “expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect,”25 then a young adult would certainly 
 
18 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263. 
19 Id. at 263-64. 
20 Id. at 266. 
21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675, 682 (1986)). More recently, the Court held that a high school principal did not violate the 
First Amendment by ordering a student to take down a banner at a school event with the words 
“Bong Hits 4 Jesus.” See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397-98, 409 (2007) (“The First 
Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at school events student expression that 
contributes to [the danger of illegal drug use].”). 
22 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
23 Id. at 776.  
24 130 S. Ct. 876, 905-06 (2010). The majority in Citizens United stated that there is “no [First 
Amendment] precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which 
are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not. . . . With the advent of 
the Internet, . . . the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political and 
social issues becomes far more blurred.” Id. 
25 First National Bank, 435 U.S. at 776. 
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have stronger rights than currently acknowledged by the courts, and animals 
might as well. For example, the censored articles in the high school newspaper 
in Hazelwood—one on teen pregnancy and the other on the effect of divorce 
on children—were undeniably the kind of speech that the First Amendment 
was meant to protect. 
For that reason it is tempting simply to dismiss the corporate speech 
cases as wrongheaded, as Chief Justice Rehnquist did in dissent for many 
decades.26 But if the cases can be reconciled, the main difference the courts 
draw between animals, minors, and corporations centers on the quality of 
the speech in question, and in particular the sense that the expression 
reflects intelligent choices. A corporation, an “artificial being” in Chief 
Justice Marshall’s words,27 is an intelligent and autonomous abstraction, 
capable of deliberation and of expressing opinions in skilled and expressive 
ways. When a corporation expresses opposition to a new tax, for example, it 
recognizes the danger of the tax to itself, and usually contributes to a debate 
in an intelligent and powerful way (indeed, the main complaint is usually 
not that corporate speech is ineffective, but that, left unsupervised, corpora-
tions are too influential).28 While there are smart animals, few argue that 
animals have conceptual capacities that rise to the level of human beings. 
Children, as partially developed humans, fall somewhere between animals 
and adults in this respect. 
If correct, the speech quality analysis suggests that computers are highly 
unlikely to have their own speech rights, at least at this stage. Admittedly, 
computers already make choices through algorithms, and at times, the 
expression of those choices mimics human expression. But machines today 
remain like Blackie the cat,29 property of their masters and owners. They 
remain, to the law at least, dumb beasts.  
 
26 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 26 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (“Nor do I believe that negative free speech rights, applicable to individuals and perhaps 
the print media, should be extended to corporations generally.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 584 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I disagree with the 
Court’s conclusion that the speech of a state-created monopoly, which is the subject of a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme, is entitled to protection under the First Amendment.”); First National 
Bank, 435 U.S. at 825-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that corporations do not have a First 
Amendment right to political expression because political expression is not “necessary to carry out 
the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[The 
majority opinion] extends the protection of [the First] Amendment to purely commercial 
endeavors which its most vigorous champions on this Court had thought to be beyond its pale.”). 
27 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).  
28 See, e.g., United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-84 (1957) (enumerating the dangers of 
corporate spending and corporate speech to the electoral system). 
29 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Rights of Creators and Users 
If the Supreme Court will not entertain a computer’s right to free 
speech, it is more likely to decide that algorithmic output is the speech of a 
computer program’s creator. The program can be understood as a mega-
phone for the speaker, or his “speech product.” Like a book, canvas, or 
pamphlet, the program is the medium the author uses to communicate his 
ideas to the world.  
However, the fact that a program can serve as a vessel for an author’s 
ideas does not always render the creator a speaker. Sometimes, the technology 
is merely a tool for facilitating the speech of others. The Royal Typewriter 
Company, despite being the creator of a speech-facilitating technology, does 
not hold the rights to speech created with its typewriters, for the company’s 
relationship to the manuscripts written with its typewriters is too remote 
and too mechanical. Ernest Hemingway may have written The Sun Also Rises 
with a portable Royal typewriter, but it was he, not Royal, who decided to 
end the story with a fistfight. Nor did Royal consciously select and publish 
the novel.  
That a typewriter is not a speaker may seem self-evident. But under-
standing the line that divides publishers from typewriter manufacturers 
clarifies the problem of algorithmic output. Publishers are distinguished from 
typewriter manufacturers because the former engage in an active and 
intimate selection or curation of a repertoire of literary works.30 Newspapers 
and cable operators provide perhaps the most prominent examples of this 
kind of process.31  
The boundary between speech product and communication tool divides 
computer programs. Some programs, like contemporary video games, 
clearly function as vessels for their creators’ ideas.32 Like books or films, 
they are constructed to communicate their creators’ ideas to an intended 
audience. But the algorithmic output of other kinds of programs use 
 
30 Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (“Through ‘original programming 
or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire,’ 
cable programmers and operators ‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and 
in a wide variety of formats.’” (alteration in original) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred 
Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986))). 
31 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (concluding that a 
regulation of the press violated the First Amendment because “[t]he choice of material to go into a 
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and 
treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of 
editorial control and judgment”). 
32 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects video games). 
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information as purely functional and, like the typewriter, are too far re-
moved from the information. The creator of this class of programs does not 
hold First Amendment Rights with respect to its output. The program’s 
users may bear such rights, however, if the program facilitates their speech.  
An examination of the microblogging software Twitter clarifies this 
point. Twitter enables users to post 140-character messages, called “tweets,” 
on the Internet.33 The key to Twitter is its “follow” system. A user receives 
the tweets of everyone he follows, while his followers, in turn, receive the 
tweets he writes. Twitter is an important forum for speech, even if one 
study found 40.1% of tweets to be “pointless babble.”34 Tweets are some-
times used to report news,35 and often to express opinions and political 
allegiances.36 
Twitter users are protected under the First Amendment as speakers.37 
Companies that advertise on Twitter also have some measure of protection 
under the commercial speech doctrine. You might say that Twitter falls into 
a category of speech already recognized in Reno v. ACLU,38 which recognizes 
Internet applications that resemble one-to-many publishing as protected 
under the First Amendment.39 
However, like the typewriter manufacturer, Twitter itself does not usually 
enjoy much First Amendment protection based on its handling of tweets (an 
exception might be for government action with a clear censorial motive).40 
Twitter handles much information, but the company does not identify with 
that information or take responsibility for the creative choices of its users. 
Furthermore, Twitter usually distances itself from its user-created content 
to avoid potential libel and defamation liability.41 Indeed, the U.S. Code 
 
33 See About Twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
34 See PEAR ANALYTICS, TWITTER STUDY—AUGUST 2009, at 4-5 (2009), available at 
http://www.pearanalytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Twitter-Study-August-2009.pdf (finding 
that, in a random sample of 2000 tweets posted during a two-week period, 40.1% were “pointless 
babble”—for example “I am eating a sandwich now”). 
35 See id. (finding that 3.6% of sampled tweets reported actual news). 
36 Ashley Parker, In Nonstop Whirlwind of Campaigns, Twitter Is a Critical Tool, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/politics/twitter-is-a-critical-tool-in-republican 
-campaigns.html. 
37 See United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Md. 2011).  
38 See 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited sending 
“indecent” and “patently offensive” internet communications to minors). 
39 See id. at 870 (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment 
scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].”); see also Timothy Wu, Application-Centered 
Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1170-74, (1999) (analyzing Reno v. ACLU).  
40 For a description of the triggering of the First Amendment by censorial motive see infra 
Section II.D. 
41 See Terms of Service, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/tos (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
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explicitly states that “providers of interactive computer services,” like 
Twitter, are not to be treated as “speakers” of the information they pass on.42 
To be sure, Twitter and its programmers make plenty of choices, like the 
founding decision to limit the length of tweets to 140 characters. But these 
choices are intended to facilitate the expression and communications of 
users. While no one can doubt that the use of Twitter is protected speech, 
the speech at issue seems mainly to belong to the users, and not the creators 
of the software. 
B. Speech 
1. Communications Versus Speech 
“[T]he speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly concerned 
is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives” 
writes Fred Schauer.43 Another way to phrase the same point is to distin-
guish between the broader category of communication and the much 
narrower subcategory of communication protected by the Constitution. 
Communication can be described, following Claude Shannon, as any con-
veyance of information from a sender to a receiver through some channel.44 
From this perspective, communication is ubiquitous, and unavoidable. 
Information is conveyed to humans constantly, whether by stoplights, dirty 
looks, or photons travelling through fiber optic cable. Obviously not all of 
this constitutes speech. But what does?  
 “What is essential is not that everyone shall speak,” wrote Alexander 
Meiklejohn, “but that everything worth saying shall be said.”45 As this 
suggests, distinguishing a subset of protected speech from all communica-
tions is necessarily a normative project. Meiklejohn’s implication was that 
protected speech should be taken as a small subset of communications, 
namely those “worth saying.” Robert Bork articulated an even clearer line 
between speech and communication: “Constitutional protection should be 
accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for 
 
42 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). 
43 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Con-
stitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1777-84 (2004). 
44 See CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATION 4-6 (1959). 
45 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 26 (1960). 
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judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, 
literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or pornographic.”46  
The law has long since rejected a theory as limited as Bork’s,47 and other 
theories of the First Amendment yield a broader and much less certain 
boundary between speech and communication. If, as John Stuart Mill 
suggested, the primary purpose of a free speech rule is to uncover the truth, 
either by eliminating censorship or by promoting debate, judges should 
treat a far broader range of communication as “speech.”48 As a matter of 
simple math, the more communication is protected, the greater the odds 
that the truth will be found, perhaps in an unexpected place.49 Error might 
remain unchallenged merely because the truth is hidden. Similarly, theories 
of the First Amendment that emphasize the self-development of the 
speaker through self-expression logically demand coverage for all forms of 
communications that might help the traveler on his path.50  
Some combination of these First Amendment theories has slowly trans-
formed the boundary between communication and speech. The Supreme 
Court once considered matters like “entertainment” and “advertising” 
completely outside of the interest of the Constitution, but now protects 
both.51 If never explicitly stated, it seems largely in service of some broader 
 
46 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 
(1971). For an example of another prominent theory giving enhanced protection to core political 
speech and diminished protection to the periphery, see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE 
SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 39 (1948) (“Individuals have . . . a 
private right of speech which may on occasion be denied or limited . . . . So says the Fifth 
Amendment. But this limited guarantee of the freedom of a man’s wish to speak is radically 
different in intent from the unlimited guarantee of the freedom of public discussion, which is 
given by the First Amendment.”). 
47 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (providing limited protection 
for nude erotic dancing). 
48 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21 ( John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859) 
(“[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; 
posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than 
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error 
for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”). 
49 For a description of this view of the First Amendment’s purpose, see Robert Post, Reconciling 
Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2363-66 (2000). 
50 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989) (arguing 
that “as long as speech represents the freely chosen expression of the speaker, depends for its 
power on the free acceptance of the listener, and is not used in the context of a violent or coercive 
activity,” then speech is protected). 
51 See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text; see also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 
54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising.”).  
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conception of the Amendment’s purpose that the Court has widened the 
law’s coverage. 
Yet even following a truth-seeking or self-discovery theory of First 
Amendment coverage, there remains a difference between protecting 
favored forms of communication as speech, and a fully inclusive position 
that would treat all communications as speech. The latter position quickly 
yields absurd consequences and cannot be taken seriously. 
It is not hard to see why. A fully inclusive theory of the First Amend-
ment would need to treat as speech forms of communication utterly devoid 
of ideas or content. Honking horns and shooting firecrackers communicate 
something, but what exactly? As a practical matter, the First Amendment 
would also soon begin to clash with other areas of the law, like contract law, 
employment law, and securities regulation. Yes, these laws regulate communi-
cations, and some do so quite thoroughly, but what judge would have the 
stomach to let every contract dispute or conspiracy charge turn on free 
speech questions? Finally, such an approach would constitutionalize enor-
mous areas of the law. At some point a broad theory of speech would 
encounter the anticanonical influence of Lochner v. New York,52 or the 
prescription that the federal judiciary should not strike economic legislation 
based on its policy preferences.53  
We need go no further. The consequences of covering all communica-
tions would simply be too much to bear. The line between communications 
and speech exists as much as a judicial necessity as anything else. But how 
and where is that line drawn? 
2. Exclusions and Inclusions 
Descriptively, we can see that the line between speech and communica-
tion has been drawn mainly by category.54 Two kinds of categories define 
 
52 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that “the freedom of master and employé to contract with 
each other . . . cannot be prohibited or interfered with”); see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 379, 417 (2011) (noting that Lochner “was once famously indefensible” and that it 
remains “firmly within the anticanon”). 
53 See Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process 
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 30-31 & n.108 (1979) (“It is surprising to discover, 
however, that these economic considerations add up to a constitutional impediment to legislative 
control of the marketplace.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on 
First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 429-32 (2006) (noting a criticism that “in the 
guise of constitutional analysis, [courts] inappropriately substitute[] their own views for the views 
of the legislature as to the merit, wisdom, efficacy, and worthiness of public policy”). 
54 Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. 
REV. 265, 267-82 (1981) (“[C]ategorization can scarcely be called a first amendment technique, 
because it cannot be avoided. The only question is how the category will be drawn.”). 
  
2013] Machine Speech 1509 
 
the line. The first are explicit and informal exclusions, where the Supreme 
Court has declared a type of communications not to be speech at all, despite 
its communicative nature. The second are categorical inclusions, situations 
or media where the Supreme Court declares that speech claims will always 
be heard by federal courts. The result is that no single sentence can define 
the boundary. Rather, it is best depicted by adding up inclusions and 
exclusions. 
The categorical approach has been the subject of much scholarly criti-
cism55 (some even doubt its existence56), but it is an approach easier to 
criticize than improve upon. Compared to an open-ended balancing rule, 
the categorical approach provides a clearer sense of where the First 
Amendment is “on” and where it is “off.” This clarity is important, especially 
given the relative strictness of First Amendment doctrine.57 
A full description of exclusions and inclusions would form a short trea-
tise; this is a summary. There are two types of exclusion, formal and 
informal. Formal exclusions refer to categories of communication that the 
Supreme Court does not recognize as speech because the information 
conveyed is valueless. This includes incitement,58 false statements of fact,59 
 
55 See, e.g., Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and 
Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 463-64 (1977) (“[D]efenders of ad hoc balancing have 
argued that first amendment issues are too complex for categorical responses, that broad rules are 
brittle and will tend to generate categorical exceptions, that categorical rules are disguises behind 
which judges covertly engage in intuitive balancing, and that categorical guarantees inject the 
Supreme Court too far into disputed questions of policy that should be left to, or at least shared 
with, the democratic branches of government.” (citations omitted)); see also Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Absolute rules would inevitably 
lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions would eventually corrode the rules.”); Wallace 
Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 
479, 484 (1964) (“In a better world, no doubt, clear and precise legal rules would anticipate all 
possible contingencies.”); Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 
30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 695 (1983) (arguing that “categorical theories of the first amendment prove 
unsatisfactory”).  
56 See, e.g., 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 12:9 
(release 26, 2012) (“Th[e] categorical approach . . . has largely been discarded by the Court.”). 
57 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that, 
as to the First Amendment, “fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more 
subjective balancing tests”); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that, as to the First 
Amendment, the use of “traditional legal categories is preferable to . . . ad hoc balancing”).  
58 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that First 
Amendment protection does not extend to advocacy that is “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
59 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that “so long as they do 
not impose liability without fault,” the states may impose liability “for a publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual”). 
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obscenity,60 and child pornography.61 Occasionally the excluded categories 
change. The most famous example is commercial speech, which went from 
nonspeech to speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council.62 
Courts also recognize informal exclusions for certain forms of communi-
cation, often but not invariably, by describing them as “conduct.” The 
method for informal exclusions differs from that of formal exclusions: the 
courts do not declare the communication valueless, but instead decline to 
find that speech is happening. For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca-
demic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the Supreme Court reviewed a law (the 
Solomon Amendment) that withheld federal funding from law schools that, 
in opposition to the government’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, restricted 
military recruiters’ access to their students.63 The Court found that, in this 
context, the law schools were not speakers because the law “affects what law 
schools must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they 
may or may not say.”64 Rather than finding the communication devoid of 
value, the Court instead declared that the relevant action was not speech.  
Spence v. Washington serves as a general guide to the line between speech 
and conduct.65 A college student protesting the Vietnam War hung an 
American flag upside down and adorned it with a peace symbol using black 
tape.66 The Supreme Court held that the student’s display was protected 
speech,67 stating that the First Amendment applies when “[a]n intent to 
convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding 
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it.”68 
Unfortunately, even as a line between speech and conduct, the Spence 
standard does not describe the boundary well, as many scholars have 
pointed out.69 For one thing, there are plenty of expressive acts that meet all 
 
60 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been categorically settled 
by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”). 
61 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (“[C]hild pornography . . . is unprotected 
by the First Amendment.”). 
62 See 425 U.S. 748, 761-73 (1976) (establishing the contemporary commercial speech doctrine). 
63 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006). 
64 Id. at 60. 
65 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). 
66 Id. at 406. 
67 Id. at 415. 
68 Id. at 410-11. 
69 See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1252 
(1995) (“The fundamental difficulty with the Spence test is that it locates the essence of constitu-
tionally protected speech exclusively in an abstract triadic relationship among a speaker’s intent, a 
specific message, and an audience’s potential reception of that message. . . . [Furthermore,] the 
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of Spence’s criteria but still shouldn’t get the protections of the First 
Amendment.70 Political assassination clearly conveys a particularized message 
likely to be well understood by anyone hearing about it, but the First 
Amendment does not protect assassination. Spence’s failure to acknowledge 
the significance of context renders the standard hopelessly overbroad. It 
cannot be described as the line between speech and conduct, though some-
times it may provide guidance. 
Next, the inclusions are harder to understand but no less important. These 
are the media, like broadcasting, and situations or contexts, like protests, 
that the Supreme Court has indicated are primed for speech claims.71 We 
might say that they are where speech happens. An inclusion works this way: 
when the medium is used, the communicator is presumptively a speaker.72  
Typically, when the Supreme Court faces a relatively new medium of 
communication that it has not yet confronted, it sets forth a foundational or 
category-recognizing case that decides whether it is of a nature that will be 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny and whether it will be limited in some 
way. There are many such medium-announcing cases, from Red Lion 
(broadcasting)73 to Reno v. ACLU (the Internet)74 and Brown v. Entertain-
ment Merchants Ass’n (video games).75 
 
constitutional recognition of communication as possibly protected speech also depends heavily on 
the social context within which this triadic relationship is situated.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First 
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 773 (2001) (arguing that “Spence is a profoundly 
unsatisfactory test for deciding what nonverbal stuff counts as sufficiently ‘expressive’ to trigger 
First Amendment scrutiny,” because it “merely states sufficient, not necessary, criteria for determin-
ing if conduct is expressive”).  
70 See, e.g., Post, supra note 69, at 1252 (noting that a person spray-painting a political mes-
sage on a city bus would satisfy the Spence test but that “no court in the country would consider 
[his criminal conviction] as raising a First Amendment question”). 
71 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (“Although broadcasting is 
clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, differences in the characteristics of new 
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” (citations omitted)); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that only the 
“action side of [a] protest” may be regulated (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
72 See Schauer, supra note 54, at 300 (“When a rule describes a category of facts with some 
specificity and when that rule mandates the results that flow from inclusion or exclusion from the 
specifically defined category, the judge has merely to place the case in the proper category in order 
to determine the correct result. Things will never be quite this simple, but it is possible to reduce 
or minimize the degree of discretion . . . .”).  
73 See 395 U.S. at 386. 
74 See 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Should it be dispositive, for the question of algorithmic 
speech, that Reno declared the Internet a fully protected “medium” of expression, when many 
computers convey the results of their expression over the Internet? I don’t think it can be. In Reno, 
the Supreme Court recognized no universal disability, as it were, for speech on the Internet. See 
Wu, supra note 39, at 1170 (asserting that the rule pronounced in Reno is that “The Internet Gets 
Full First Amendment Protection”). Hence a blogger who reaches his audience using the Internet 
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Like the exclusion categories, the inclusion categories evolved over time. 
The most famous example is film: in 1915, the Supreme Court concluded, 
based on the premise that motion pictures are a type of meaningless, for-
profit entertainment, that they simply did not trigger the First Amend-
ment.76 The Court explained that “the exhibition of moving pictures is a 
business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other 
spectacles, not to be regarded . . . as part of the press of the country or as 
organs of public opinion.”77 It later reversed itself in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, concluding that “motion pictures are a significant medium for the 
communication of ideas.”78 
Burstyn provides some insight on how judges determine whether a given 
technology or context is primed for First Amendment claims. The Court 
stated,  
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the 
communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a 
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine 
to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. 
The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not 
lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.79 
The Court suggests that motion pictures gain protection because, even if 
they were mere sideshow novelties in the early 1900s,80 over time, the 
medium of film has transformed into a vehicle to express, appreciate, or 
understand ideas, doctrines, attitudes, and the like. 
 
gets the same protections as an essayist using paper. But the equivalence of paper and the Internet 
Protocol doesn’t tell us anything about particular ways that the Protocol can be used, just as the 
protection granted to a newspaper tells us nothing about a man who writes a contract using paper. 
See id., at 1170-74 (arguing that the rule pronounced in Reno “groups into one constitutional box a 
huge range of highly variable Internet usage”). 
75 See 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
76 Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 244-45 (1915). 
77 Id. at 244. 
78 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).  
79 Id. (footnote omitted). 
80 The earliest commercial films were silent, were usually under ten minutes, and rarely had a 
plot or characters. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION 
EMPIRES 62 (2011). However, by 1915, the year of the Mutual Film decision, the film industry had 
already transformed. That was, for example, the year of the release of The Birth of a Nation (D.W. 
Griffith 1915), which advocated white supremacy. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Mutual Film was, 
therefore, indefensible even in its own time.  
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3. Algorithmic Output: Speech or Communication? 
We can predict two things based on the inclusion/exclusion framework. 
First, courts will find that at least some types of computer programs are the 
subject of a categorical inclusion. In fact, the Supreme Court has already 
started down this path with its treatment of video games.81 Second, the 
courts will rely on informal exclusions to deny coverage in other software 
cases. This point is developed more fully in Part III, which describes the de 
facto exclusions that are based on functionality.  
In the 1980s, lawyers first claimed that video games were protected by 
the First Amendment.82 The games of that era, like Donkey Kong and Pac-
Man, were certainly games of high skill considered classics by aficionados,83 
but they are harder to describe as bearers of ideas. The first court to consid-
er a video game as speech compared it to “a pinball game, a game of chess, 
or a game of baseball,” declaring that the games lacked any “informational 
element,”84 and denied the effort of an arcade game owner to invoke the 
First Amendment.85  
By 2011 matters had changed. Some video games now use the full range 
of literary devices found in film and novels, as well as other devices that 
more traditional media cannot mimic. For example, Ico is a Japanese video 
game with an affecting storyline. A child is born with horns, exiled from his 
village, and placed within a stone prison from which he must escape.86 The 
game was widely praised for its plot and cited by film director Guillermo 
del Toro as a “masterpiece” and an influence on his work.87 Halo, a best-
 
81 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
82 See, e.g., Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass. 1983) 
(describing the claim of a plaintiff that a city regulation limiting the number of coin-operated 
video games permitted in a business establishment violated the First Amendment); Am.’s Best 
Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (describing 
the claims of a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment that a city regulation of coin-operated 
video games violated the First Amendment); Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 472 A.2d 809, 
810 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983) (“The plaintiff has urged that video games are a form of free speech 
and that the restrictions imposed upon him by the defendant commission abridge that right.”); 
Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n, 444 N.E.2d 922, 923-24 (Mass. 1983) (describing the First 
Amendment claims of a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief against a local commission that denied 
his application for licenses for seventy-five coin-operated video games). 
83 See Scott Oldham, Videogame Nirvana, POPULAR MECHANICS, Dec. 1997, at 146 (describ-
ing “classics such as PacMan, Ms. PacMan, Donkey Kong and Asteroids”). 
84 Best Family, 536 F. Supp. at 174. 
85 See id. (“[V]ideo games do not implicate First Amendment problems . . . .”). 
86 Ico Review, GAMESPOT (Sept. 26, 2011, 5:34 PM), http://www.gamespot.com/ico/reviews/ 
ico-review-2815038. 
87 See, e.g., Hellboy Director Talks Gaming, EDGE (Aug. 26, 2008, 8:25 AM), http://www.edge-
online.com/features/hellboy-director-talks-gaming (quoting director Guillermo del Toro as saying 
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selling video game franchise from Microsoft, has a complex plot not unlike 
a science fiction movie. A game like Grand Theft Auto communicates a kind 
of humorous glorification of the low-level criminal that is not unlike the 
films of Quentin Tarantino.  
In Brown, therefore, the Supreme Court did for video games what 
Burstyn did for film88: effected a re-categorization, based on the fact that the 
medium had evolved into something different. Justice Scalia wrote for the 
majority: 
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video 
games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar 
literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through 
features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the 
virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.89 
While video games are a type of computer program, Brown does not declare 
that all computer programs fall under the coverage of the First Amendment. 
Yet the evolution of games and film before them are an important reminder 
that the technologies here described, even if not inclusions today, may 
someday be so declared. 
C. Motive 
Motive is the trump card of First Amendment jurisprudence. Even if 
the communication in question would not otherwise be considered speech, a 
demonstrated censorial motive on the part of the government can trigger 
First Amendment analysis anyhow. In other words, a demonstrated purpose 
in restricting the content of speech on the part of the government can, just 
by itself create First Amendment coverage. 
 
that gaming has had “[a] lot” of influence on his movies and that “[t]here are only two games I 
consider masterpieces: Ico and Shadow of the Colossus”); Matt Peckham, PlayStation 3 Exclusive ICO 2 
Trailer Leaked pre-E3?, PCWORLD (May 20, 2009, 7:01 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
165226/ico_2_leaked.html (noting that “everybody loves ICO” and describing the game as an 
“action-puzzler” and “a pensive boy-meets-girl fairy tale” that “had gamers raising that silly 
question ‘Games as art?’” and “impell[ed] message board philosophy dilettantes to grapple 
breathlessly with the mechanics of Free Will 101”); Jamin Smith, Ico & Shadow of the Colossus 
Review, VIDEOGAMER (Aug. 9, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.videogamer.com/ps3/ico_shadow_of_ 
the_colossus/review-2.html (noting that “you’ll be rewarded with an experience that will stay with 
you for a very long time” and ranking Ico and another game by its creator as “two of the most 
important games ever made”). 
88 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
89 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).  
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“First Amendment law,” wrote Elena Kagan in 1996, “has as its primary, 
though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives.”90 
Kagan’s descriptive thesis is that the familiar distinctions between content-
specific and content-neutral scrutiny in First Amendment analysis tend to 
allow the judiciary to find and condemn impermissible censorial motiva-
tions.91 The idea expands on Laurence Tribe’s well-known description of 
two “tracks” in First Amendment jurisprudence, where the first imposes 
higher scrutiny on regulations where the government’s concern is the 
communicative impact of the speech in question.92  
If Kagan and Tribe are descriptively correct, it must follow that the 
presence of a censorial motivation is more likely to trigger First Amendment 
coverage in the first place. Stated differently, Kagan and Tribe focused on 
the importance of the analytical step where the courts decide whether the 
government act targets the effects of speech or the evil unrelated to the 
viewpoint of the speech in question—a time, place, or manner regulation. 
But it stands to reason that similar concerns operate at “step zero” as well— 
deciding whether the First Amendment is triggered at all.  
This initial analysis might best be demonstrated by a comparison of ar-
son, flag-burning, and hate speech cases. Consider a typical prosecution for 
arson in a house-burning. Burning down someone’s house can be communi-
cative—it suggests, at a minimum, disapproval of the resident or perhaps his 
tastes. Nonetheless, a defense that states the arsonist is protected by the 
First Amendment because he was expressing his hatred for his rival would 
usually be thrown out without much consideration.93 
In contrast, in a prosecution for burning a flag at a protest94 or burning a 
cross on a Black family’s lawn,95 the First Amendment analysis will be 
 
90 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 69, at 776 
(noting that in some cases the “only real First Amendment question . . . is whether the state’s 
purpose was to punish someone for speaking”). 
91 See Kagan, supra note 90, at 451 (stating that the distinction between content-based and 
content-neutral actions “separates out, roughly but readily, actions with varying probabilities of 
arising from illicit motives”). 
92 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 791-92 (2d ed. 1988) (“If a 
government regulation is aimed at the communicative impact of an act . . . [the] regulation is 
unconstitutional unless government shows that the message being suppressed poses a ‘clear and 
present danger,’ constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or otherwise falls on the unprotected side of 
one of the lines the Court has drawn to distinguish those expressive acts privileged by the first 
amendment . . . .”).  
93 See, e.g., United States v. Rainey, 362 F.3d 733, 734 (11th Cir. 2004) (ignoring an arson 
defendant’s First Amendment protest claims).  
94 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding a criminal conviction for burning a 
flag during a protest unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
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triggered as a matter of course. There may be disagreement about whether 
those acts should be protected by the First Amendment, but the initial 
question of coverage is almost impossible to contest. The main difference 
between these examples would appear to be government motive. Unlike in 
the more ordinary household arson, there is some suspicion in the latter 
cases that the Government is prosecuting those who lit the fire because of 
their views, not because of the act in question, particularly if the statute 
targets acts of hatred. This censorial motive leads to an automatic triggering 
of First Amendment coverage.  
D. Abridgement 
An extraordinarily opaque dimension of the First Amendment’s domain 
is provided by the requirement that the law in question must actually 
burden speech. While rarely linked to the text of the First Amendment, we 
might consider this as a requirement of actually “abridging”96 the freedom 
of speech and press. This area of doctrine is particularly confusing, even by 
First Amendment standards. 
Consider what happens in cases where the copyright laws are challenged 
as violating the First Amendment. Imagine a case where a man seeks to 
illustrate the absurdity of a prominent trial by borrowing the visual style 
and rhyme of The Cat in the Hat by Dr. Seuss.97 The owner of a copyright 
can ask a court to impose a prior restraint on publication of that book,98 and 
even potentially have copies of the book destroyed.99 In some cases, the 
Supreme Court has refused to subject copyright law to a full First Amend-
ment analysis, arguing that copyright is an “engine of free expression”100 
that avoids First Amendment scrutiny unless some aspect goes beyond the 
 
95 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-81 (1992) (overturning a criminal conviction 
for burning a cross on a Black family’s lawn because the relevant hate crime statute was unconsti-
tutional under the First Amendment). 
96 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
97 See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(reviewing the claim of a publishing company for preliminary injunction against the publication of 
“a rhyming summary of highlights from the O.J. Simpson double murder trial” that allegedly 
violated a copyright of The Cat in the Hat).  
98 See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006). 
99 Id. § 503(a)–(b). 
100 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“In our 
haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to 
be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
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“traditional contours” of copyright.101 As Rebecca Tushnet has pointed out, 
that pattern is true of various other laws that seem mysteriously outside of 
First Amendment scrutiny, or subject to less scrutiny.102 
While the rationales tend to vary, the best explanation is that courts re-
fuse to undertake a First Amendment analysis because they do not believe 
that the law “abridges” or burdens speech. Rather, whether a law promotes 
speech (copyright), or is targeted at some evil clearly removed from speech-
related objectives, courts decline to bring the First Amendment into play. 
Unfortunately, it is often hard, and sometimes impossible, to separate this 
analysis from the speech/communications analysis discussed above, 103 
because sometimes a law evades First Amendment scrutiny by targeting 
communications that the court has declared nonspeech.104  
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S DE FACTO  
FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE 
 
I have described four doctrinal lines that define the boundaries of the 
First Amendment. The question now is this: how should or will courts 
decide whether algorithmic output is protected by the First Amendment?  
Here is my thesis: Functionality will usually be the line that divides 
speech and communications in this area, in the absence of suspicious 
censorial motives.105 Doctrinally, this takes courts into an area of the First 
Amendment that is among the least well understood. But a careful look at 
the cases suggests that courts already maintain an informal exclusion based 
on functional considerations.  
 
101 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“[The lower court] spoke too broadly 
when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’ 
But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protec-
tion, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.” (citation omitted) (quoting Eldred v. 
Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). 
102 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in 
Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 
42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 36-39 (2000) (noting that the argument that copyright promotes First 
Amendment values has been made in the context of a number of other areas of the law, including 
“pornography, sexual harassment, hate speech, campaign finance, and new media”). 
103 See supra Section II.C.  
104 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
385 (1973) (finding that employment advertisements expressing a sex preference for employees 
were commercial speech, and thus were unprotected by the First Amendment). 
105 See supra Section II.D. 
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A. Functionality Generally 
Functionality as a legal concept is employed mainly in copyright, patent, 
and trademark law, each of which has distinctive doctrinal versions.106 
Sometimes described as the “nonfunctionality requirement,” this doctrine 
denies the benefits of the law to some otherwise qualifying expressive work, 
based on the argument that the work is primarily designed or intended to 
perform some task unrelated to the goals of the law in question. As such, it 
acts to prevent a party from using the law to achieve objectives completely 
unrelated to the goals of that law. It is a limit on opportunism. 
This might be easier to understand using an example. If viewed as a 
work of sculpture, a car engine might be indistinguishable from any other 
detailed metal sculpture and thus qualify for the legal protection that 
copyright, trademarks, or design patents give to expressive work. But the 
functionality doctrine denies protection because the car engine is designed 
for another purpose: powering a vehicle.  
Why not protect a car engine?107 The reason is best understood in terms 
of preventing lawyerly opportunism. In the intellectual property context, 
judges describe the doctrine as preventing interference with one of two 
systems: the competitive process, or some other legal regime, such as patent 
law. A representative dictum invoking both is Justice Breyer’s description of 
the doctrine in the trademark context: “The functionality doctrine prevents 
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s 
reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a 
producer to control a useful product feature.”108 Pointing out that a patent 
conveys limited monopolies over function, he added, “If a product’s func-
tional features could be used as trademarks . . . a monopoly over such 
 
106 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (“To 
qualify for [design patent] protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance 
that is not dictated by function alone . . . .”); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 
844, 850 n.10 (1982) (determining a product feature to be functional in trademark law “if it is 
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article”); 
Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987) (determining that 
the functionality requirement in copyright law precludes protection when the “ultimate design [is] 
as much the result of utilitarian pressures as aesthetic choices”).  
107 See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, The Role of the Non-Functionality Requirement in Design Law, 
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 847, 869 (2010) (arguing that the functionality 
doctrine is flawed because it is difficult to draw a distinction between functional and nonfunctional 
products at the registration phase, and proposing that this determination be postponed until a case 
of infringement is brought); Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 824 
(2011) (using the functionality doctrine to show the lack of consensus among the courts as to the 
role of trademark law in promoting the value of competition).  
108 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
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features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents 
and could be extended forever.”109  
The functionality doctrine is a typical common law invention in the 
sense that it responds, on a case-by-case basis, to overreaching parties and 
untenable consequences. Nonetheless, it is helpful to gain some idea of how 
judges distinguish between functional and expressive elements if we are to 
understand functionality in the First Amendment context. Judges do not 
define what is “functional” in any theoretically deep way: something is 
functional, according to the Supreme Court, “if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”110 For 
the Europeans, who have an equivalent doctrine in their design law, func-
tionality refers to “features [or the] appearance of a product which are solely 
dictated by its technical function.”111 Circularity is an obvious feature of 
both definitions.  
It is in the distinction between function and expression that we get a 
better idea of what functionality really means. Sometimes courts simply 
decide what is functional based on their own observational powers. For 
example, in Publications International, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., a publisher sought 
to trademark the design of its books, which featured, among other things, 
gilded page edges.112 Judge Posner pronounced the golden coloring to be 
aesthetically functional, because “[g]old connotes opulence” and “children 
love gold.”113 That was the end of the matter. 
Others have conducted more searching (yet not necessarily better) 
efforts to distinguish the functional from the expressive. In an influential 
article, Robert Denicola suggested that the boundary between functional 
and expressive elements should be determined by an examination of the 
creative process itself, and ultimately, the creator’s purpose.114 Denicola 
wrote that protection “ultimately should depend on the extent to which the 
work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considerations.”115 
If the work is responsive to, or influenced by, utilitarian factors, then, 
logically, it cannot be purely expressive. We might understand this as a kind 
of “blocking out”—the engineer who is working on a car engine is heavily 
 
109 Id. at 164-65. 
110 Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 850, n.10. 
111 See Council Directive 98/71, art. 7(1), 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 31 (EU). 
112 164 F.3d 337, 338, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1998). 
113 Id. at 343. 
114 See Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright 
in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 743 (1983) (arguing that it is the “process more than the 
result that gives industrial design its distinctive character”). 
115 Id. at 741. 
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constrained by the need to make the best engine possible and has little or no 
room left in his process for art. Seen another way, this asks for an inquiry 
into the motive of the designer. Was the motive, the reason the article was 
designed the way it was, the result of purely expressive or artistic considera-
tions? Or was the goal something else? The Second and Seventh Circuits 
have adopted this search for motive.116  
There is no use going too far in this examination of functionality in the 
intellectual property context, for the exercise bears diminishing returns. 
However, what we can understand is that a nearly identical problem con-
fronts judges facing a First Amendment plaintiff pressing claims that cover 
highly functional elements, namely, rich opportunities for lawyerly oppor-
tunism. As in the intellectual property area, protecting functionality may 
yield consequences unrelated to the goals of the Constitution.  
B. The First Amendment’s Functionality Doctrine 
Courts considering these matters should be aware that the First 
Amendment already contains a de facto functionality doctrine (or, stated 
differently, it has a nonfunctionality requirement), though it is not as 
explicit as in intellectual property law. Long before the development of 
advanced software, courts declined to extend First Amendment protection, 
based on the potential for gamesmanship or on concerns about the disrup-
tion of some other system or legal regime.  
There are two different ways in which the functionality doctrine operates. 
First is the carrier/conduits category. Here, the actor’s relationship to the 
information in question is too mechanical to make it a speaker.117 The 
claimant does handle or transform information, but its relationship is 
characterized by a lack of identification with the information it handles, 
along with a lack of specific knowledge and usually a lack of legal responsi-
bility. Sometimes courts call the actions “conduct” instead of speech. In any 
event, this is where we find telephone companies, courier services, law 
schools hosting job interviews, and manufacturers of typewriters and 
television sets. All of these firms handle or transform speech, but none is a 
speaker (not even a loudspeaker). As I will suggest, many software products 
will fall into this category as well. 
 
116 See Pivot Point Int’l v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If the 
elements do reflect the independent, artistic judgment of the designer, conceptual separability 
exists.”); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (explicitly 
adopting the standard proposed by Denicola to distinguish the functional from the expressive). 
117 See supra subsection II.A.1. 
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In a second category are communicative tools. In this category, the infor-
mation conveyed, in context, is functional: it performs some task other than 
the communication of ideas. Navigational charts are the definitive example, 
but the rationale is closely related to the academically well-studied topic of 
“speech acts” or “situation-altering utterances.”  
1. Carrier/Conduits 
The first version of the functionality doctrine excludes from First 
Amendment protection actors whose involvement with information is too 
distant or mechanical to be speech. This covers those that handle or transform 
information in a manner usually lacking specific choices as to content, lack 
specific knowledge as to what they are handling, or do not identify as the 
publisher of that information. 
Several prominent Supreme Court cases help clarify this. In Turner 
Broadcasting System, the Court explained that a cable operator obtains First 
Amendment protection only because it “exercis[es] editorial discretion over 
which stations or programs to include in its repertoire.”118 The knowing 
selection of that repertoire distinguishes cable operators from carriers that 
merely move information without identifying or selecting the content they 
carry. The same inference applies to a newspaper: a newspaper knowingly 
selects and identifies with the content it presents.119 In contrast, a telephone 
company, which merely carries information from place to place, has never 
been able to claim First Amendment rights.120  
The category is also well illustrated by the previously discussed Rumsfeld 
v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.121 Even though law schools 
 
118 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. 
Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)). 
119 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 261 (1974) (White, J., concurring) 
(invoking an “elementary First Amendment proposition that government may not force a 
newspaper to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom 
floor” and noting that the Supreme Court has never held that “the First Amendment permitted 
public officials to dictate to the press the contents of its news columns or the slant of its editorials”); 
see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) 
(reaffirming “unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free 
expression of views”). 
120 See, e.g., Susan Dente Ross, First Amendment Trump?: The Uncertain Constitutionalization of 
Structural Regulation Separating Telephone and Video, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 281, 297-98 (1998) (noting 
that historically, “[t]elephone services fell outside the ambit of First Amendment jurisprudence 
because the telephone was treated as an essential utility, not a speaker”); Note, The Message in the 
Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1092 (1994) 
(“[C]ommon carrier status insulates telephone companies from the expectation that they endorse 
all speech in phone conversations.”). 
121 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
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refused to allow military recruiters on campus in opposition to “don’t ask, 
don’t tell,” the schools weren’t considered speakers.122 As the Court explained, 
“accommodating the military’s message does not affect the law schools’ 
speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and 
recruiting receptions.”123 In particular, the Court stressed the unlikelihood 
that the law schools would be identified with the military recruiters’ speech 
merely on account of their hosting them.124  
The cable, newspaper, and interview-hosting cases all suggest the same 
conclusion. They describe a difference between a publisher, who actively 
curates the sum total of the information presented and is identified with it, 
and those entities that have a more mechanical relationship to the infor-
mation they carry, process, or otherwise handle. A court might say the latter 
are engaged in “conduct;” we can also say that, by operation of the de facto 
functionality doctrine, these companies are not protected by the First 
Amendment. 
2. Communicative Tools 
Sometimes courts decline to protect communications as speech based on 
an assessment that the information in question acts as a tool. The paradig-
matic examples are maps and navigational charts.125 As the Ninth Circuit 
explained: 
Aeronautical charts are highly technical tools. They are graphic depictions 
of technical, mechanical data. The best analogy to an aeronautical chart is a 
compass. Both may be used to guide an individual who is engaged in an 
activity requiring certain knowledge of natural features. Computer software 
that fails to yield the result for which it was designed may be another.126  
 
122 Id. at 60. 
123 Id. at 64. 
124 Id. at 65. 
125 See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to ad-
dress whether “the First Amendment renders the theory of strict liability for a defective product 
inapplicable to . . . charts,” because the argument was not raised in the court below); Saloomey v. 
Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming the lower court finding that a 
navigational chart was defective, but engaging in no First Amendment analysis); Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Nevada law, and 
affirming the lower court’s judgment that a navigational chart was defective for the purposes of 
products liability without analyzing the claim under the First Amendment); Fluor Corp. v. 
Jeppesen & Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 475 (Ct. App. 1985) (applying California law, and applying 
strict liability for a defective navigational chart without analyzing the claim under the First 
Amendment). 
126 Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1991).  
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Courts decline to protect tools for reasons that overlap with its treatment of 
what philosophers of language call “speech acts.” As Catharine MacKinnon 
explained, “social life is full of words that are legally treated as the acts they 
constitute without so much as a whimper from the First Amendment.”127 
Some communications by their very issuance or utterance perform some 
action, such as “[s]aying ‘kill’ to a trained attack dog.”128 That is to say, some 
communications don’t simply express a view, or even cause some effect, but 
accomplish something by their very utterance. Expressing a verbal acceptance 
of an offer not only tells people something, but also creates a legally binding 
agreement.  
Hence, the same rationale that claims tools are not speech says that legal 
documents like contracts, wills, commercial paper, and the like are not 
subject to First Amendment protection as against the law of contracts, trusts 
and estates, or financial regulation. To be fair, courts haven’t been very 
explicit in their reasoning: the only Supreme Court case to consider the 
matter of contract enforcement, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,129 did so in 
dictum and is hard to interpret. The Court excluded a contract claim from 
First Amendment scrutiny on the assumption that the application of laws of 
general applicability does not implicate the First Amendment130 (which isn’t 
necessarily true131). Similarly, while scholars have had their say,132 courts 
have rarely explained why exactly certain criminalized communications, 
such as criminal solicitations, perjury, and conspiracies are not subject to 
First Amendment analysis.133  
*      *      * 
 
127 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 12 (1993). 
128 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
129 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
130 See id. at 669 (noting that “generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment” 
simply because they are enforced against the press).  
131 See id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting) (disputing whether “the fact of general applicability 
[is] dispositive”). 
132 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 739-78 (1980) 
(developing standards for the application of the First Amendment to a variety of different words 
that encourage others to commit crime); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1095, 1217 (2005) (arguing for “a First Amendment exception for speech that substantially 
facilitates crime” when “the speech is said to a few people who the speaker knows are likely to use 
it to commit a crime”; when “the speech . . . has virtually no noncriminal uses”; or when “the 
speech facilitates extraordinarily serious harms” (emphasis omitted)). 
133 See Volokh, supra note 132, at 1103 (“[T]he Supreme Court has never squarely confronted 
[speech that makes it easier for others to commit a crime] and lower courts . . . have only 
recently begun to seriously face it.”). 
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Between these two strands of doctrine, I think we can safely say that, 
like other areas of the law, the First Amendment usually denies protection 
to carrier/conduits and mere communicative tools. The reasons, while rarely 
given, seem to be similar to those found in intellectual property cases: 
judges fear the consequences of allowing a law intended to protect expression 
to venture into areas where other motivations are paramount. They may also 
fear opportunism on the part of lawyers—an effort to use the Constitution 
for goals quite unrelated to speech. Beyond this, and the caveat that a 
censorial motive would probably trump the functionality doctrine, it is hard 
to say more. 
IV. EASY AND HARD CASES:  
SEARCH ENGINES AND CONCIERGES 
We can now summarize what we have learned. The means by which 
courts determine the coverage of the First Amendment is complex and 
comprises at least four main dimensions. Operating within this framework 
are the two versions of a First Amendment functionality doctrine described 
above. In this final Part, I suggest how these doctrines might play out in 
easier and harder cases concerning the output of computer programs. 
A. Easy Cases 
As indicated by Brown, the courts will recognize as speech a wide range 
of communications that are made using a computer program.134 While not 
strictly specified by Brown, I predict that this will include blog posts, tweets, 
online photo streams, and probably slightly shorter or more symbolic 
expressions such as Yelp or Amazon reviews written by humans. These 
forms of expression are sometimes heavily shaped by computer programs, 
but in the same way that the choice of charcoal or paintbrush shapes an 
artist’s output. By this analysis, Bland v. Roberts, a 2012 district court 
decision holding Facebook’s “like” feature not to be “speech” is clearly 
erroneous and should be reversed.135 
At the other extreme, some of the output of computer programs will fall 
into the heart of the functionality exclusion. Car alarms and antilock 
braking systems are clear examples of communicative tools. Alarms act on 
the user as a warning. This doesn’t mean it is impossible that the sound of a 
car alarm could form a part of protected speech (say, as part of a song or art 
 
134 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
135 See 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 2012) (“[M]erely ‘liking’ a Facebook page is in-
sufficient speech to merit constitutional protection.”). 
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installation). But more generally, an alarm functions to warn that a car may 
be in the process of being stolen. 
Software navigation and map programs offer harder cases. Based on my 
description of the functionality doctrine, I believe that these technologies 
are still unprotected tools, because their communications perform a function 
unrelated to the communication of ideas, namely, telling someone how to 
get from A to B. Consider, for example, Rosenberg v. Harwood.136 A woman 
claimed that, relying on Google Maps’ walking directions, she stepped onto 
a freeway and was hit by a car.137 Google answered the complaint with, 
among other defenses, an argument that its directions are protected 
speech.138 While the court wisely avoided the constitutional question,139 its 
analysis suggests that the First Amendment argument should be rejected 
under the functionality doctrine. The map was meant to assist the user with 
a task, not to express to him any ideas or to influence his worldview. Direc-
tions are much like commands, more speech acts than anything else. For 
that reason the First Amendment ordinarily ought not to be triggered. 
B. Hard Cases 
1. Search Engines 
Search engines are programs that use an algorithm to guess, within some 
enormous body of text, items that represent the best match for the user’s 
search. Search engines were once mainly used for searching specialized data-
bases, but they have become ubiquitous over the last decade. The well-known 
Westlaw program uses various sophisticated algorithms to retrieve docu-
ments based on keywords or search codes that the user composes.140 More 
important to nonlawyers is the Google search engine, which returns the 
links to webpages it deems most likely relevant to a user’s keywords (or, in 
search engine parlance, most likely to provide answers). A sophisticated 
search engine like Google’s also creates an index with a consistent and 
constant ranking of all of the potential results for a given search.141  
 
136 No. 100916536, 2011 WL 3153314 (D. Utah May 27, 2011). 
137 Id. at 1. 
138 Id. at 2. 
139 See id. 
140 WESTLAW CLASSIC (2013), http://web2.westlaw.com. 
141 See, e.g., Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1342 (2008) (demonstrating 
that, while the average user rarely travels beyond the first page of relevant results for a Google 
search for “cars,” the search engine has “indexed over 300 million websites related to ‘cars’”). 
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Given the functional nature of search engines (as the word “engine” 
suggests), it might seem easy to conclude that search results do not trigger 
the First Amendment. In a 2008 paper, Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale 
reached that conclusion with relative ease.142 However, several matters make 
the claim worth further discussion.  
First, Google has repeatedly claimed in court that its selection of search 
results is protected speech and has won such claims in federal district 
court.143 Second, by the mid-2000s, online search was a dominant method 
for finding information. Search engines like Google and Microsoft’s Bing 
function like a switchboard for the Internet—a means of connecting users, 
websites, and advertisements in one place. Indeed, so powerful are search 
engines as an information gateway that it is typical for governments to focus 
regulations on them as a means of trying to regulate speech.144 Many 
countries, including the United States, censor search results to some extent 
for various reasons, ranging from political control of citizens to copyright 
protection.145 
The most prominent case discussing a search engine’s First Amendment 
rights is Search King v. Google.146 Search King, a search optimization firm, 
promised to elevate its clients’ results in a Google search.147 Google caught 
wind of the scheme and actively demoted Search King’s clients.148 Unhappy 
with the demotions, Search King sued Google in Oklahoma for tortious 
interference with contract.149 Google raised the First Amendment among its 
defenses.150 The district court held that Google’s rankings of webpages are 
protected speech, and on that basis refused to grant Search King a prelimi-
nary injunction.151 
 
142 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Account-
ability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1193-1201 (2008). 
143 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, 
Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. 02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
144 See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 70 (2006) (noting that the government can control usage of the Internet by 
controlling intermediaries, such as Internet Service Providers, search engines, browsers, and that it 
is difficult for content providers to “evade this control by just circumventing intermediaries”). 
145 See id. at 75 (noting that the United States, France, and Germany all try to control the 
public’s access to content through Google). 
146 2003 WL 21464568. 
147 Id. at *1. 
148 Id. at *1-2. 
149 Id. at *2. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at *4 (“[U]nder Oklahoma law, protected speech—in this case, PageRanks—cannot 
give rise to a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations because it cannot be 
considered wrongful, even if the speech is motivated by hatred or ill will.”). 
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Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the district court erred 
in reaching the First Amendment issue. The tort claim was frivolous and 
easily dismissed, based on the court’s own finding that the acts were not 
wrongful.152 Constitutional avoidance was designed for exactly this kind of 
case, where a complex constitutional issue of first impression might be 
addressed unnecessarily.153  
Nor is the district court’s reasoning particularly helpful (other than as an 
example of oversimplification). It construed Google’s search results as 
protected speech because search results are a form of “opinion.” As the court 
wrote: “PageRanks are opinions—opinions of the significance of particular 
web sites as they correspond to a search query. . . . Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that Google’s PageRanks are entitled to ‘full constitutional 
protection.’”154 
Holding that any communication is protected speech if it can be called 
an “opinion” is hopelessly overbroad. For example, a person’s written will is, 
by its nature, something of a ranking of his relatives and friends, and thus 
an opinion, yet not one that gains First Amendment protection. The 
approach is particularly useless in the software context, for nearly any 
automated function could in some sense be called an “opinion.” Car alarms 
express the alarm’s opinion that a car is in danger of being stolen, and an 
automatic transmission that shifts from third to fourth gear might be said to 
be expressing either its (or the manufacturer’s) opinion as to when to switch 
gears. It isn’t that the opinionated selection of information can never be 
enough to make someone a speaker, a point to which I return in the consid-
eration of concierge services. But calling something an “opinion” cannot be 
conclusive.155 
 
152 Oklahoma law requires that “the interference was malicious and wrongful, and was not 
justified, privileged, or excusable.” Id. at *2. Google’s demotions to protect the integrity of its 
search were clearly “privileged.” See Morrow Dev. Corp. v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 875 P.2d 411, 
416 (Okla. 1994) (“One who, by asserting in good faith a legally protected interest of his own or 
threatening in good faith to protect the interest by appropriate means, intentionally causes a third 
person not to perform an existing contract . . . does not interfere improperly with the other’s 
relation if the actor believes that his interest may otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the 
performance of the contract or transaction.” (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 773 (1977))). 
153 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other 
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”); Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 122 
(1st Cir. 2000) (noting that “[s]tate courts, like their federal counterparts, normally seek to avoid 
construing common law rules so as to create serious constitutional problems”).  
154 Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4.  
155 Cf. Genesee Cty. Employees’ Ret. Syst. v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Trust 2006-3, 825 F. 
Supp. 2d 1082, 1236 (D.N.M. 2011) (“The credit ratings at issue in this case are not entitled to 
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In defense of the district court, its opinion was an unpublished dismissal 
with limited precedential value. More elaborate arguments appear in 
Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk’s white paper for Google, and in Stuart 
Benjamin’s article in this issue.156 Volokh and Falk’s argument depends on 
the claim that Google is akin to a newspaper or other publisher.157 A 
newspaper selects the most important stories of the day and presents them 
on the front page.158 Google’s search engine, similarly, ranks the world’s 
webpages with respect to their relevance to various criteria, and hence, 
according to Volokh and Falk, gains the same protections.159  
Volokh and Falk’s paper, however, misapplies the relevant law. Newspapers 
and other publishers, unlike mere functional carriers of information, gain 
protection because their work product reflects a knowing selection and 
arrangement of the entirety of the articles that make up the final news-
paper.160 The newspaper selects and endorses its articles, and it also usually 
commissions their authorship in the first place. The articles, in some sense, 
are the newspaper, and thus it makes sense to say something like, “Look 
what The Washington Post said about X yesterday.”  
In contrast, Google comes to a mass of information and indexes it. It 
does not endorse the sites it ranks—the millions of websites accessible 
through Google’s search engine cannot be said to be Google’s speech 
product. If a Google search turns up website Y about topic X, no one says, 
“It was interesting what Google had to say about X.” Google’s sorting of 
results and generation of an index might therefore be best characterized as 
“conduct” under Rumsfeld.161 Google helps its users find websites, but it does 
not sponsor or publish those websites.  
Nor, as a legal matter, is Google responsible for the sites it links, as 
Google has repeatedly asserted to gain statutory immunities.162 As Bracha 
 
First Amendment protection.”); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Moody’s Corp., No. CGC-09-
49024, at 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 2010) (credit ratings are not speech but “an economic activity 
designed for a limited target for the purpose of making money”).  
156 VOLOKH & FALK, supra note 2. 
157 Id. at 4. 
158 Id. at 3-4. 
159 Id. 
160 See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 836-39 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting peti-
tioner’s claims of copyright infringement and defamation against Google because, among other 
reasons, Google was not the information content provider); Lastowka, supra note 141, at 1351 (“The 
procedure that Google follows affords it a ‘safe harbor’ from infringement liability under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.”). Though under some circumstances Google can be held 
liable under the copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006) (listing exceptions to the exemption 
from liability for “information location tools” service providers). 
  
2013] Machine Speech 1529 
 
and Pasquale point out, “Dogged by complaints related to the content of 
listed websites, search engines . . . claim merely to be the infrastructure or 
platform that delivers content.”163 In short, as neither a conscious curator 
nor a legally responsible publisher of content, a Google search is a far cry 
from a newspaper. 
Unlike Volokh and Falk, Stuart Benjamin relies not on a metaphor, but 
rather his restatement of the Spence test to conclude that search engine 
output counts as “speech” for the First Amendment. He writes, 
The touchstone of the Court’s First Amendment cases has always been that the 
underlying activity entails an expression of ideas, even if it is not “a narrow, 
succinctly articulable message.” Communication thus seems to require, at a 
minimum, a speaker who seeks to transmit some substantive message or 
messages to a listener who can recognize that message. Thus, in order to 
communicate, one must have a message that is sendable and receivable and 
that one actually chooses to send.164 
While Benjamin’s “sending a message” standard accurately describes what 
the Court says, it doesn’t come close to describing what courts do. As applied 
to software, it misses, as I’ve repeatedly said, the importance of functionality. 
Taken more generally, the standard is overbroad: everything from nonpoliti-
cal vandalism through political assassination “sends a message,” but not all 
of that can reasonably be speech. That is why, as Robert Post puts it, the test 
“is transparently and manifestly false.”165  
In any event, even by Benjamin’s own standard, the argument that the 
operation of a search engine “entails transmission of ideas” is a stretch; it 
demands a conception of “idea” that widens the category beyond recognition. 
According to Benjamin, Google hopes to convey ideas like “quality” or 
“usefulness,”166 but then so too did the designers of my coffeemaker.167 A 
theory that turns the design of home appliances into a form of constitutional 
speech is probably overbroad. The point is that there necessarily must be 
some line between actual speech products and mere tools in order to avoid 
ridiculous results, and the Spence standard ain’t it.  
If Google isn’t a vessel for ideas, what then, is it? While useful, Google’s 
main search, in particular, is probably best akin to a highly advanced and 
 
163 Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 142, at 1192. 
164 Benjamin, supra note 2, at 1461 (footnotes omitted).  
165 Post, supra note 69, at 1252. 
166 Benjamin, supra note 2, at 1470. 
167 Krups claims that its products convey “Precision, Perfection, Passion . . . beyond the 
everyday, beyond the norm, beyond reason.” KRUPS, http://www.krups.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013) (alteration in original). 
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powerful index. Neither the newspaper nor cable operator cases support the 
idea that the First Amendment protects something like an index, as opposed 
to content adopted or selected by the speaker as its own.168 It is that step—
the adoption of information, as a publisher, as opposed to merely pointing 
the user to it—that marks the difference. 
Examining the respective purposes of the search engine creator and the 
newspaper editor is also illustrative. A newspaper’s purpose is to communi-
cate ideas, stories, impressions, and viewpoints to its audience. It is a 
definitional part of “the press” named in the First Amendment itself, with 
distinctive and unusual organizational goals. The search engine’s primary 
purpose is, variously, to locate information or, more recently, provide 
answers, but in any event, its first objective is to serve as a tool for helping 
its users locate desired information within a giant collection of information. 
While searching “who was Walter Pater” produces Google’s best guess of 
what the user wants, it does not produce a series of choices that represent 
the “direct espousal of a political or social doctrine”169 on behalf of the 
designer. Rather, Google is just trying to find what the user wants. That is 
the difference, in some fundamental way, between a tool and speech—the 
first directly serves the user, while the second attempts to persuade him. 
This analysis is subject to two caveats. First, over the last five years, both 
Google and Bing have begun to offer more of their own content in many 
searches, and these communications, produced and endorsed by the company 
itself, will sometimes be protected speech. Second, some of Google’s 
specific searches are more carefully curated than its general search. Third, as 
stated earlier, a censorial motive on the part of the Government is a trump 
card that would change everything. Were Congress to pass a law asking 
Google to manually demote sites critical of “the World’s Greatest Delibera-
tive Body,” it is not hard to predict immediate judicial scrutiny. 
The fact that a search engine is functional does not mean the First 
Amendment has no role in search-related cases. Rather, as suggested by the 
discussion of Twitter and microblogging, the important First Amendment 
issues in search will often come from the perspective of users. Consider 
were a state to order all search engines to block results linking to infor-
mation it deemed treasonous or a threat to national security (as the Chinese 
government does).170 Laws based on the censorial motive would demand 
 
168 See supra subsection III.B.1. 
169 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
170 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 144, at 95-104 (cataloguing efforts by the Chinese 
government to censor content online); Michael Wines, Google to Alert Users to Chinese Censorship, 
N.Y. TIMES ( June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/world/asia/google-to-alert-users-
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First Amendment scrutiny, though such scrutiny would mainly be based on 
the speakers’ and users’ rights. The reason is that the burden in such a case 
falls directly on the speaker and the listener, even though it is the search 
engine, the intermediary, that is being used as the enforcer.171 
This may seem a superficial or technical difference, but it is not, for it 
changes the kind of cases that can be brought. The law in question must 
somehow burden a search engine’s users. It is not enough that it is an 
annoyance to the owner of the search engine. 
2. Automated Concierges and Other Services 
A trend in the personal technology industries is for computers to take 
on the role of personalized assistants, or curators of sorts. This is an area 
where Apple and Amazon are leaders. Apple’s iTunes offers, for example, a 
“Genius” function that creates a playlist based on its user’s musical prefer-
ences. Amazon makes book recommendations based on what it thinks its 
customers will like, and so on. 
When, if at all, do laws affecting such recommenders or concierges trigger 
First Amendment scrutiny? Imagine, for example, that a concierge gave 
advice that led to some injury. Would a product liability lawsuit be subject 
to First Amendment scrutiny?  
We might first consider what the law has done with the human equiva-
lents. On the one hand, private advice, especially communications in the 
course of professional services, is treated as a form of functional communi-
cation and doesn’t usually trigger First Amendment protection.172 This is 
why a doctor may be liable for malpractice if he gives a very bad or grossly 
erroneous diagnosis. On the other hand, if a doctor writes a book that 
 
to-chinese-censorship.html (noting that the names of many current and former Chinese leaders 
are banned from Google searches in China).  
171 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 144, at 68 (noting that governments often “control 
behavior not individually, but collectively, through intermediaries” like search engines and Internet 
Service Providers); Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The 
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 20 (2003) (noting that 
online gateways, such as search engines, have transformed into “virtual gatekeepers” that help 
“control[] online traffic or affect[] access to information”).  
172 See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 695 (Minn. 1980) (per 
curiam) (affirming a lower court decision to hold a lawyer liable for negligent advice given to a 
client without any consideration of First Amendment implications); Carson v. City of Beloit, 145 
N.W.2d 112, 114, 117 (Wis. 1966) (reviewing a trial court decision denying a negligence claim 
against doctors who incorrectly diagnosed a patient’s condition and thus contributed to his early 
death without any consideration of First Amendment implications).  
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happens to be wrong about medical facts, his efforts are likely nonetheless 
to be protected by the First Amendment against product liability law.173 
Justice White explained the difference in these outcomes as follows:  
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to 
exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individ-
ual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice 
of a profession. . . . If the government enacts generally applicable licens-
ing provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the profession, 
it cannot be said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of speech or the 
press subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where the personal nexus be-
tween professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport 
to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose 
circumstances he is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to 
function as legitimate regulation of professional practice with only incidental 
impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, 
subject to the First Amendment’s command . . . .174  
We are back, then, to the question that has been the center of this Article, 
but seen from a different angle. Is the output of a concierge program merely 
providing some function for its user like the doctor’s diagnosis? Or does 
such advice fall closer to a recognized medium, the generalized book or 
instruction manual that happens to be communicating one-on-one simply as 
a matter of technological form?  
To answer the question we must distinguish between two types of recom-
mendation tools. Some concierge or recommendation programs rely on 
nothing more than data already provided by the user to deliver a “recom-
mendation,” which is really nothing more than reminding the user what she 
already wants. These are tools unlikely to be protected. In contrast, it is also 
 
173 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to 
“extend liability . . . to the ideas and expressions contained in a book” because of the First 
Amendment, even though the book was a “reference guide” with information on “the habitat, 
collection, and cooking of mushrooms”); Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 
41, 42, 45 (D. Mass. 1994) (denying a claim of tortious misrepresentation against a publisher that 
released a book containing false information about the credentials of an attorney, and noting that 
the decision was partially driven by First Amendment considerations); Jones v. J.B. Lippincott 
Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988) (noting that “[n]o case has extended [liability] to the 
dissemination of an idea or knowledge in books or other published material” because it might 
“chill expression and publication which is inconsistent with fundamental free speech principles”); 
Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (rejecting a claim that a publisher 
failed to warn of defective ideas contained in its book, without reaching the issue of First 
Amendment protection).  
174 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote 
omitted). 
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possible to imagine an intelligent concierge program that would be more 
distinctly opinionated and therefore protected. Imagine a program that 
embodied the programmer’s deeply held views as to the best restaurants in 
New York. The program might reflect snobbish disregard of “New American” 
cooking and a celebration of French Cuisine above all else. Asked for 
recommendations, this program would return not simply a mechanical 
projection based on the user’s previous choices, but rather a true recommen-
dation based on the opinions, and indeed the prejudices, of the programmer. 
This kind of concierge, I predict, is far more likely to qualify for First 
Amendment coverage, based on the idea that it can be called a speech 
product. The rule of thumb is this: the more the concierge merely tells the 
user about himself, the more like a tool and less like protected speech the 
program is. The more the programmer puts in place his opinion, and tries 
to influence the user, the more likely there will be First Amendment 
coverage. These are the kinds of considerations that ultimately should drive 
every algorithmic output case that courts could encounter. 
CONCLUSION 
The questions considered in this Article seem likely to grow in im-
portance, and courts will be asked to answer important category-defining 
questions in the coming years. Perhaps it might be helpful if the somewhat 
hidden functionality doctrine of the First Amendment were less mysterious. 
This Article has made an effort to bring to light that obscure area of the law. 
